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Abstract: A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity
due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights
about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work
productivity. We compare two different types of decision-making regimes: autocratic
decision-making and group voting. Using a laboratory experiment to simulate a data-entry
organization, we find that, while autocratic decision-making and group voting regimes both
curtail cyberloafing (by over 50%), it is only in group voting that there is a substantive
improvement (of 38%) in a cyberloafer’s subsequent work performance. Unlike autocratic
decision-making, group voting leads to workgroups outperforming the control condition
where cyberloafing could not be stopped. Additionally, only in the group voting regime did
production levels of cyberloafers and non-loafers converge over time.
Keywords: autocratic decision-making; cyberloafing; group voting; social dilemma;
workgroup performance
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1. Introduction
Many of the challenges organizations face when attempting to achieve their goals are social dilemmas:
interdependent decisions where an individual attempting to satisfy his or her own interests in the short
run conflicts with the collective’s interests in the long run [1]. With the advent of the Internet, a social
dilemma that has received increased attention in management studies is cyberloafing, where an employee
“uses their company’s Internet access for personal purposes (i.e., web surfing and personal email use)
during work hours” [2] (p. 675). In social dilemma terminology, cyberloafing is categorized as a social
trap: a situation where an individual indulges in a short-term private benefit (e.g., using the Internet for
personal use during work hours) while passing a long-term cost on to the collective; e.g., lost labor and
reduced productivity to the workgroup or organization [3]. Surely, employees may use the Internet to
cope with stress or to stimulate their creativity [4,5]. While recognizing the inevitable “grey area”
between Internet use and abuse (cyberloafing) and acknowledging these caveats [6], we focus on clear
cases of cyberloafing, which disrupt work [7] and are thus counterproductive [5].
The costs of cyberloafing to organizations can be substantial. Knights [8], for instance, reports $470
million in lost productivity to U.K. firms from workers taking 15 to 30 min of company time to place a
bet using online gambling websites. Another study reports that workers using Facebook and Twitter are
interrupted once every 10.5 min by instant messages and tweets, taking about 23 min after using a social
media website to refocus their attention entirely back to their work and costing their companies about
$4500 per worker every year [9]. These monetary figures leave managers with the task of increasing
cooperation from cyberloafers.
Van Lange, Balliet, Parks and Van Vugt’s [10] recent review on social dilemmas suggests two
decision-making regimes that managers can use to encourage cooperation: autocratic decision-making
and group voting. Drawing from normative decision theory [11], we seek to answer the research
question: What effects do group decision-making and autocratic decision-making structures have on
cyberloafing and subsequent worker performance in workgroups?
We address this question in a laboratory environment where workgroups of nine performed a data
calculation and entry task while supervised by a monitor. In addition to a control condition, we considered
autocratic and group voting regimes. In the autocratic decision-making condition, a monitor would
unilaterally decide whether to turn off workers’ access to the Internet in the middle of the experiment.
In the group voting condition, a majority vote from workers was used to decide whether workers’ access
to the Internet should be turned off. We find that autocratic and group voting structures reduce cyberloafing
by over 50%, but only group voting boosts the cyberloafer’s subsequent work productivity by a substantive
(and statistically different) amount: 38%. Unlike the autocratic regime, group voting leads to workgroups
outperforming the control condition where cyberloafing could not be stopped.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. First, we review the literature pertinent to social
dilemmas, decision regimes and cyberloafing and state our hypotheses. Second, we summarize our
research methodology. Third, we report the results of our hypothesis testing both in terms of statistical
and practical significance. Lastly, we conclude with discussing the theoretical and practical implications
of our results for social dilemma theory and organizations.
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2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Vroom and Yetton’s [11] seminal taxonomy of organizational decision-making regimes outlines two
extreme paths that an organization may take when solving a problem. At one extreme is the autocratic
decision-making regime where decisions are made by a manager or boss about what those facing the
decision situation can do [12]. The motivation behind an autocratic decision-making regime is
efficiency. A manager, being aware of a cyberloafing problem, can take steps to avoid collective ruin
brought upon by persistent exploiters [13–15]. The effectiveness of Internet abuse detection and
disciplining actions within an autocratic decision-making regime rests on general deterrence
theory [16–18]. In particular, an autocratic structure allows for a manager to impose an organizational
policy that limits Internet access to stop current and future cyberloafers from exploiting other group
members [19].
However, the centralized decision rights of an autocratic manager may come at a cost. Most workers
value autonomy in their jobs [20] and may feel spite toward those who dictate terms about what they
can do [21]. In fact, workers who slack on the job may slack even more out of spite when unilateral
actions are taken to force their cooperation [22]. In relation to cyberloafing, losing access to the Internet
by an autocratic authority may lead the cyberloafer to not only find something else to pass the time (other
than work), but exert even less effort out of spite on the job.
Hypothesis 1: After the implementation of the Internet policy, the autocratic decision-making
regime will fail to increase individual production by cyberloafers compared to the control
condition where cyberloafing cannot be curbed. As a result, workgroup production under an
autocratic decision-making structure will fail to surpass that of the control condition.
At the other end of Vroom and Yetton’s [11] taxonomy is a group decision-making regime. As a form
of employee empowerment [23], a group decision-making regime places decision-making rights in the
hands of group members and their manager [24]. As reviewed by Van de Ven and Delbecq [25], group
decision-making regimes can vary in the extent to which group members interact. At one extreme, group
members may have unstructured discussions about a problem the group faces and develop solutions
through conversation. At the other extreme, group members do not converse, but merely vote
independently about proposed solutions to a problem. The current research focuses on this second
minimal group decision process, which we refer to as a group voting regime. Group voting resembles
the democratic leadership style studied by Lewin, Lippitt and White [26]. In relation to cyberloafing, a
group voting regime lets workgroups decide through a vote to turn Internet access on or off.
Previous work on employee empowerment suggests that a group voting regime increases workgroup
performance [27,28]. The reason for this positive relationship may be that shared decision rights among
workgroup members give these workers a sense of ownership over their work and trust that each worker
will do his or her share of the labor [29]. Furthermore, a group voting regime may positively affect group
members who disagree with the majority about what group members can do on the job. Procedural
justice research reminds us that workers often value the procedures for reaching an outcome more than
the outcome’s value [30]. To capitalize on this asymmetry, the administration may give employees voice
over the design of their work; e.g., voting about Internet access [31]. Worker productivity increases after
merely giving employees voice about rules on their jobs [27], because choice over elements of work
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increases worker-perceived procedural justice and subsequent work effort [32]. Van den Bos, Vermunt
and Wilke’s [33] research on procedural justice suggests that a group member’s commitment and
motivation to work will be higher when given voice compared to when not given voice, even when the
outcome of a group voting conflicts with that member’s preferences or previous behavior.
Hypothesis 2: After the implementation of the Internet policy, the group voting condition
will lead to higher levels of individual production among cyberloafers compared to the
control and autocratic decision-making conditions. As a result, workgroup production under
the group voting condition will be higher than in the control and autocratic conditions.
3. Method
3.1. Sample
Participants were 220 students recruited from a subject pool of about 2000 undergraduate and
graduate students at a university in the Western United States. Participants received a $7 show-up fee
plus the opportunity to earn more money for participation in a 2.5-h experiment. We conducted 6 sessions
in the control and group voting conditions and 10 sessions in the autocratic condition. Participants earned
$32.50 on average, which includes the show-up fee. Our participants thus earned on average $13 per
hour, which compares to average earnings of data-entry clerks in the United States, which were $13.37
per hour ± $2.75 [34] at the time of the study.
3.2. Design and Procedure
We employed a one-way factorial design with three conditions: a control condition, an autocratic
decision-making condition and a group voting condition. Each participant was randomly assigned to one
of the three conditions summarized in Table 1. In the control condition, participants could use the
Internet at any time during the experiment. In the other two conditions, Internet access could be turned
off after the second period. In the autocratic decision-making condition, one of the participants, the
monitor, decided unilaterally whether to turn off or maintain Internet access. In the group voting
condition, Internet access was turned off if the majority of workers (five out of nine) voted to do so.
3.2.1. Instruction Period
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were directed to private cubicles and asked to read a set
of computerized instructions. Since the instructions were somewhat involved [35], participants had
20 min to read them, with a timer displayed on a large screen at the front of the laboratory. The
instructions indicated that they were one of ten members of a workgroup; the workgroup would
undertake a 1 h and 40-min task, broken up into five 20-min periods. Each member would work on the
task, separately and in isolation, but their earnings would be calculated based on group performance.
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Table 1. Summary of conditions.

Condition

Description

Control

Internet access was maintained by the experimenter after Period 2.

Autocratic decision-making condition
Group voting condition

The monitor unilaterally decided whether to turn off or maintain
Internet access after Period 2.
Workers voted on whether to turn off or maintain Internet access after
Period 2. The decision selected by the majority of workers was implemented.

No. of Sessions
(Participants)
6 (60)
10 (100)
6 (60)

Three minutes before the end of the instruction period, the experimenter announced the time
remaining and handed out a printed summary of the instructions. None of the participants asked
questions or requested extra time. At the end of the instruction period, the experiment was launched from
the experimenter’s room.
All conditions involved the same number of participants (nine workers and one monitor), so as to be
able to compare production patterns across conditions. The person who was assigned the role of monitor
kept this role for the entire experiment. We conducted six sessions of 10 participants for all conditions,
but the autocratic decision-making condition, for which we conducted a total of 10 sessions. More
sessions were conducted for the autocratic decision-making condition so as to collect more observations
on voting decisions, since, in this case, only the monitor voted on future Internet access, leaving us with
only one vote per session.
3.2.2. Software
The experiment was conducted using the Virtual Organizations software developed by CYDeveloper
LLC. The software facilitates a multi-party team task, controlled centrally by an experimenter.
3.2.3. The Work Task
Adapted from previous research using summation tasks [36], the work task was a particularly long
and laborious task intended to resemble the monotony that can accompany organizational life and prompt
Internet usage. The task required summing up tables of 36 numbers without using a pen, scratch paper
or calculator (see Figure 1). Participants could sum as many tables as they wanted so that the work task
was never interrupted during a period. After completion of a table, and whether the summation was
correct or not, a new table appeared on the screen.
Each table had six rows and six columns of randomly-generated numbers between zero and ten.
Before providing the grand total, participants had to provide a separate subtotal for all of the 12 rows
and columns. Calculating these subtotals did not directly generate earnings, but could help participants
compute the grand total, which generated a 40¢ profit to the group only if the grand total was correct. If
the grand total was incorrect, a 20¢ penalty was deducted from group production. So that participants
could not sabotage other group members’ production, penalties only applied when the worker who
completed the table incorrectly had produced a positive amount sufficient to bear the penalty. After
completing a table, participants learned whether their answers were correct and how much money they
earned. At the end of each period, participants learned the total amount of money generated by all
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participants’ efforts on the work task. Individual earnings were calculated such that each participant
obtained an equal share of 10% of workgroup production similar to a gainsharing plan. The gainsharing
design feature induces interdependence among participants, as their performance on the task not only
affects their individual earnings, but also the other participants’ earnings. The current setting is a social
dilemma, as each member of the group can increase overall performance at their own cost of effort.

Figure 1. Sample work task.
In addition to the work task earnings, participants received a fixed wage of $2.40 per period, which
was obtained by clicking on a yellow box at the bottom of the participants’ screens. The fixed wage was
implemented to mimic real work environments in which pay for performance is only limited to a portion
of the wage. In our experiments, about half of total pay was earned on the work task, while the remainder
corresponded to fixed pay.
3.2.4. Internet
At any point during the experiment, all participants were told they could switch from the work task
to Internet browsing. Within the bounds of university policy, participants could use the Internet however
they liked, including email. Their confidentiality was assured and maintained, but the software tracked
the exact amount of time spent on each activity. Although participants could not complete the work task
while browsing the Internet, switching was quick and easy. Through the action menu, participants
returned to either the last Internet page or the last number table that they had seen. If participants chose
the Internet, the work task window was replaced by an Internet window (embedded in the software; see
Figure 2). Students were not allowed to bring cell phones into the lab, so that Internet browsing, if any,
was embedded into the experimental platform.
At the end of the second period, depending on the condition, Internet access was either maintained or
removed. In the control condition, Internet access was maintained after the second period. In the group
voting and autocratic decision-making conditions, organizational members decided on whether Internet
access should be turned off after Period 2. Therefore, even if the Internet were turned off, participants
could still loaf on the job by sitting idle.
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Figure 2. Embedded Internet screen.
3.2.5. Monitoring
In all conditions, one of the 10 participants referred to as “C” (the rest of the workers were referred
to as “Bs”) was given the ability to watch everyone else, and everyone else was aware of this ability. If
the monitor selected the monitoring option from the action menu, he or she used a separate screen to
choose whom to monitor (anywhere from one to all other participants) and to actually perform the
monitoring. For each selected participant, a column in a table listed their activities (e.g., switched to
Internet, provided a subtotal), their current earnings and their percentage contribution to the workgroup
total (see Figure 3). For example, the first row in Figure 3 informs the monitor that Participant B13 just
switched to the Internet screen and that B13 had produced 40¢ on the task thus far (that is, after 13 min
and 18 s of the 20-min period). The production of Participant B13 corresponded to 33% of workgroup
production (120¢) thus far. Participants who were being monitored saw the figure of an eye and a text
message indicating that “C is watching you”, independently of the activity they were undertaking. The
figure and message resemble the common practice of notifying employees when they visit restricted
websites. Notification systems are becoming popular, as illustrated by the team application developed
by the largest online marketplace: oDesk. oDesk allows employers to overtly monitor freelancers via
webcams (the analogue of our eye image), which take frequent pictures that are immediately sent back
to the employer.
Participants could spend as much or as little time as they wanted on the various activities (work task,
Internet and monitoring), each of which was undertaken on a separate screen. To switch activities,
participants simply chose the corresponding option from a drop-down menu at the bottom-right of
their screens.
3.2.6. Voting
In the autocratic decision-making condition, the monitor unilaterally decided whether to turn off or
maintain Internet access after Period 2. In the group voting condition, all workers (excluding the

Games 2015, 6

595

monitor) voted on whether to turn off or maintain Internet access after Period 2. The details of the voting
process were described to participants during the instruction period.

Figure 3. Monitoring screen with a zoom on Participant B13.
3.3. Measures
Individual production is defined as the total monetary amount (in U.S. Dollars) generated by a
participant’s answers on the work task. Workgroup production is defined as the sum of the individual
production of the nine workers in the organization.
Internet usage is defined as the percentage of a participant’s total time that was spent on the Internet
screen. Internet usage was considered cyberloafing in this case, because time spent on the Internet was
time away from the work task, costing money for participants and their colleagues. We confirm this
interpretation of Internet usage in our organizational setting in which it is shown, for example, that a
worker’s accuracy on the summation task typically decreased after spending time browsing the
Internet [37]. This would not be the case if workers used the Internet to take a break and restore
concentration with the objective of increasing productivity thereafter.
4. Results
4.1. Periods 1–2: Internet Access on
We start by analyzing the first two periods of the experiment during which Internet access was
available in all conditions. Average Internet usage across conditions was equal to 13.9% (SD = 0.20) of
workers’ available time (see Table 2). This is similar to the on-the-job Internet usage, for non-work
purposes, of about 13% reported in the 2005 report by American Online and Salary.com [38]. Our
cyberloafing rate is also a little less than half the rate [39] of the study of Wagner and colleagues’ [40]
that measures cyberloafing behaviorally in a classroom setting.
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Table 2. Individual Internet usage in the first two periods across conditions (all workers,
excluding the monitor).
Condition

Average Internet Usage
(% of Available Time)

Proportion of
Cyberloafers

Average Internet Usage
for Cyberloafers

Control (n = 54)
Autocratic decision-making (n = 90)
Group voting (n = 54)
All (n = 198)

13.8%
14.2%
13.6%
13.9%

44.4%
47.8%
48.2%
47.0%

29.3%
28.4%
26.8%
28.2%

In the remainder of this section, we provide the results of t-tests in parentheses and the p-values for
the corresponding non-parametric tests in brackets (either Wilcoxon rank sum or sign rank tests). The
use of the Internet in the first two periods in the autocratic condition (M = 14.2%, SD = 0.20), group
voting condition (M = 13.6%, SD = 0.20) and control conditions (M = 13.8%, SD = 0.20) were not
statistically different from each other (all p > 0.85 for pairwise comparisons using t-tests, (all p > 0.67
for the corresponding Wilcoxon rank tests)). A large proportion of participants (53.0%) did not browse
the Internet and dedicated their time to the work task. We refer to Internet users as cyberloafers and to
the remaining ones as non-loafers. The proportion of cyberloafers did not vary statistically across
conditions (all p > 0.69 for pairwise comparisons using proportion tests). Because participants faced the
Internet screen at the beginning of each of the periods, those who were not categorized as cyberloafers
spent some minimal amount of time on the Internet screen before switching to the task screen at the
beginning of the period. Even though these participants faced the Internet screen, they did not
intentionally browse the Internet. Their average Internet usage was equal to 1.3% (SD = 0.01) of their
available time: about 16 s each period (no statistical differences across conditions were found; all
p > 0.82 using t-tests). In the first two periods, workers’ average production per period in the control
(M = $1.17, SD = $1.15), autocratic decision-making (M = $0.99, SD = $0.89) and group voting
(M = $1.24, SD = $1.08) conditions was not statistically different from one another (all p > 0.14 (all
p > 0.24); see Table 3). Lastly, workgroup production across the control (M = $26.26, SD = $6.99),
autocratic decision-making (M = $25.45, SD = $5.91) and group voting (M = $28.19, SD = $7.73)
conditions was not statistically different from one another (all p > 0.16) (all p > 0.55).
Table 3. Average individual production per period (in U.S. Dollars) across conditions
(all workers, excluding the monitor; n denotes the number of workers per condition).
Periods 1 and 2

Periods 3–5

Condition

Cyberloafers

Non-loafers

All

Cyberloafers

Control (n = 54)

$0.61

$1.62

$1.17

$0.82

Nonloafers
$2.05

All
$1.50

Autocratic decision-making (n = 90)

$0.71

$1.25

$0.99

$0.91

$1.87

$1.42

Group voting (n = 54)

$1.02

$1.44

$1.24

$1.45

$1.73

$1.59

All (n = 198)

$0.77

$1.41

$1.11

$1.04

$1.89

$1.49

Only sessions where the Internet was turned off
Autocratic decision-making (n = 81)

$0.70

$1.13

$0.92

$0.91

$1.78

$1.35

Group voting (n = 45)

$0.97

$1.37

$1.20

$1.55

$1.68

$1.63
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4.2. Voting about Internet Access
At the end of the first two periods, the workers or the monitor decided on whether to turn off Internet
access in the remaining periods in the group voting and autocratic decision-making conditions. In both
conditions, Internet access was shut off in all but one session, practically eradicating cyberloafing. The
proportion of organizations that were able to eliminate cyberloafing in the group voting condition (5/6)
did not statistically differ from the proportion of organizations achieving this outcome in the autocratic
decision-making condition (9/10) (proportion test; z = 0.390, p =0.696). In the group voting condition,
a majority of workers (55.6%) voted to remove Internet access.
The shutdown of Internet access in the group voting condition was not exclusively due to the
non-loafers’ decision to curb cyberloafing. Forty-two percent (11/26) of cyberloafers voted to turn off
Internet access. Furthermore, thirty-two percent (9/28) of non-loafers voted in favor of maintaining
Internet access.
4.3. Periods 3 and beyond: After Internet Access Is Voted on or off
In the last three periods, average Internet usage dropped down to 4.6% (SD = 0.11) and 5.5%
(SD = 0.18) in the autocratic and group voting conditions from an initial level of 14.2% and 13.6%,
respectively. The remaining presence of Internet usage is due to the fact that one session per condition
maintained Internet access after Period 2. Internet usage was significantly higher in the control condition
(M = 25.2%, SD = 0.30) compared to the group voting and autocratic decision-making conditions over
the last three periods, and these comparisons are statistically different (all p < 0.001) (all p < 0.001).
Both group voting and autocratic decision-making regimes curbed cyberloafing effectively and did not
differ in Internet usage (t(142) = 0.373, p = 0.710) (p = 0.520).
We henceforth focus only on sessions where the Internet was turned off for a more sensitive
comparison across conditions. The qualitative nature of our statistical analysis is not affected by this
choice, and the analysis, which includes the two sessions in which the Internet was maintained, is
available upon request from the authors.
Individual performance increased statistically and significantly in size in the last three periods for all
three conditions (all p < 0.001) (all p < 0.001). This performance increase across conditions shows the
existence of learning effects (see Table 3). This finding is not surprising considering previous work
reports similar learning effects in mathematical tasks [41]. The evolution of period production did vary
across conditions in the case of cyberloafers, however (see Figure 4). In the case of cyberloafers, the
increase in individual production between the first two periods (in which Internet access was available)
and the last three periods (in which Internet access was removed) in the group voting condition (from
$0.97–$1.55, a 59.8% increase) was near double that of the autocratic decision-making (from
$0.70–$0.91, a 30.0% increase) and control (from $0.61–$0.82, a 34.4% increase) conditions.
Production of cyberloafers in the last three periods of the group voting condition was statistically higher
than in the first two periods (t(18) = 3.50, p = 0.003) (p = 0.001), whereas the difference was statistically
marginal for the other two conditions (t(23) = 1.65, p = 0.113 (p = 0.083) and t(39) = 1.88, p = 0.068
(p = 0.354) for the control and autocratic decision-making conditions). Furthermore, cyberloafers’
production was statistically higher in the group voting condition than in the autocratic decision-making
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and control conditions (t(57) = 2.54, p = 0.014 (p = 0.017) and t(41) = 2.54, p = 0.015 (p = 0.021)). There
was no statistical difference between cyberloafers’ performance in the autocratic decision-making and
control conditions (t(62) = 0.38, p = 0.700) (p = 0.770). These findings are in line with our Hypothesis 1
regarding the absence of differences in individual production between the autocratic decision-making and
control conditions.

Figure 4. Evolution of the individual production of cyberloafers (left panel) and
non-loafers (right panel) across periods and conditions.
Our findings also provide support to our Hypothesis 2. Non-loafers’ period production increased more
between the first two periods and the last three periods in the autocratic decision-making condition (from
$1.13–$1.77, a 56.6% increase) than in the control (from $1.62–$2.05, a 26.5% increase) and group
voting (from $1.37–$1.68, a 22.6% increase) conditions. Production per period was statistically higher
in the last three periods than in the first two in all three conditions (t(40) = 6.57, p < 0.001 (p < 0.001);
t(25) = 2.32, p = 0.029 (p = 0.013) and t(29) = 4.46, p < 0.001 (p < 0.001)) for the autocratic
decision-making, group voting and control conditions). Non-loafers’ production thus increased in all
conditions, but this increase was more pronounced in the autocratic decision-making and control
conditions, where shirking by cyberloafers was also more pervasive than in the group voting condition.
This observation is actually consistent with the findings of van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden [42],
who showed that workgroups, in which social loafing was pervasive, performed surprisingly well
because of the extra effort of non-loafers that aimed at compensating the particularly low level of effort
of social loafers. Importantly, non-loafers’ production levels in the last three periods did not statistically
differ across treatments (all p > 0.290) (all p > 0.380), confirming that Internet restriction policies
primarily impact those who are regular Internet users on the job; i.e., cyberloafers.
In the group voting condition, workers who voted in favor of shutting down Internet access increased
their individual level of production from the first two periods to the last three periods by 24.6%
(t(26) = 2.76, p = 0.011) (p = 0.002) compared to an increase of 55.6% for those workers who did not
(t(17) = 2.97, p = 0.009) (p = 0.008). The increase in production among workers who voted against
turning off the Internet was more pronounced for cyberloafers, whose production increased by 118.4%
(t(9) = 3.35, p = 0.009) (p = 0.006), compared to non-loafers, whose production increased by only 10.9%
(t(8) = 2.25, p = 0.055) (p = 0.475). That is, in the group voting condition, group members did not react
negatively to the implementation of an Internet policy that they opposed. Instead, they increased their
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production levels under the newly-implemented policy. The absence of a negative reaction is consistent
with procedural justice research emphasizing the positive effect of giving employees a voice in
decision-making, even when the final outcome conflicts with one’s preferences [33].
Average workgroup production in the autocratic decision-making condition (M = $42.47,
SD = $21.77) was 4.5% higher than in the control condition (M = $40.63, SD = $14.54). However,
workgroup production in the group voting condition (M = $51.84, SD = $26.36) was 27.6% higher than
in the control condition and 22.1% higher than in the autocratic decision-making condition. Even though
these differences in production are not statistically different (all p > 0.390) (all p > 0.280), the effect for
the comparison between group voting and autocratic decision-making conditions is of a moderate size
(Cohen’s d = 0.40). Our findings are consistent with our Hypothesis 1 according to which the autocratic
structure will fail to increase workgroup production statistically despite curbing cyberloafing. However,
we lack support for the second part of Hypothesis 2, as the performance of workgroups using group
voting structures does not statistically differ from the control condition, despite exhibiting a significant
increase in production. The null statistical effect is mostly explainable by the fact that, after the second
period, non-loafers’ performance did not increase as much in the group voting condition compared to
the control and the autocratic decision-making conditions. As mentioned above, the group voting
condition is the one in which the increase in production levels was the highest for cyberloafers, while
being the lowest for non-loafers. It follows that the gap in production levels between non-loafers and
cyberloafers decreased significantly over time in the group voting condition (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Difference in individual production between non-loafers and cyberloafers across
periods and conditions.
By contrast, the gap in production levels increased in the autocratic and control conditions. As shown
in Figure 5, the performance of cyberloafers and non-loafers did not statistically differ in the last three
periods of the experiment in the group voting condition (t(43) = 0.391, p = 0.698), while cyberloafers
underperformed non-loafers in the other two conditions (all p < 0.001) (all p < 0.001). The group voting
condition is the only one under which the production levels of cyberloafers and non-loafers converged
over time. The observed convergence in production among cyberloafers and non-loafers is especially
striking given that a large proportion of workers (40.0% in the five sessions in which Internet was turned
off) voted against turning off the Internet.
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Without a way of making decisions about what workers could do on the job, our workgroup’s
performance suffered: Internet usage in the control condition increased from 13.7% in the first part of
the experiment to 25.2% in the second part of the experiment. Both autocratic and group voting structures
were similarly effective in curbing cyberloafing: from an initial level of 14.2% and 13.6%, average
Internet usage declined to 4.6% and 5.5% in the autocratic and group voting conditions. This finding
echoes the study of Barker [43] that showed how self-managing teams ultimately imposed even more
control on workers’ behavior than a hierarchical system.
However, this is not all these decision-making regimes did. Organizations in the autocratic structure
condition produced $56.06 on average, which is $5.67 less than organizations in the control condition,
whereas organizations in the group voting condition increased their production with respect to those in
the control condition up to $65.30. This difference was because of the change in behavior of the
cyberloafers between the autocratic and group voting conditions.
5. General Discussion
A recent squib in The Globe and Mail suggests that answering “how can I stop people loafing in my
workgroups?” keeps leaders awake at night [44]. The current research answers this question through
comparing different decision-making regimes in a workgroup social dilemma. We found that the
decision-making structure impacts not only whether people can cyberloaf, but also what the cyberloafer
does thereafter. Autocratic decision-making and group voting regimes both removed the Internet form
of loafing in workgroups (87.5% of the time), but only group voting let leaders have their cake and eat
it too. Group voting increased a cyberloafer’s work performance even when the cyberloafer had voted
against turning off the Internet. An autocratic decision-making regime, by comparison, failed to increase
cyberloafers’ production more than the control condition after the intervention had been taken.
Our findings suggest that, despite the overwhelming monetary costs of cyberloafing identified in
recent reports [8,45], managers should refrain from following an autocratic decision-making regime to
restrict Internet access. Instead, organizations may consider letting employees decide on the Internet
restriction policy. This may not only curb cyberloafing, but increase work performance over time.
While voting on Internet access is unlikely to lead to consensus, as it was in our study, workers who
voted against the implemented measure did not react negatively. Cyberloafers increased their work
performance after having Internet access restricted. In the last hour of our experiment, after the Internet
restriction policy was implemented through group voting, cyberloafers produced 71.4% more than in the
control condition, which is equivalent to a $1.80 increase in hourly production per clerical worker.
In conclusion, cyberloafing is real in workgroups. Cyberloafing is costly to organizations. However,
cyberloafing is navigable through altering the decision-making regime in the workgroup. The key is for
organizations to select a decision-making regime that stops workers from cyberloafing while also
encouraging them to work harder. The group voting structure seems to be one way for managers to
address cyberloafing and also to get better sleep at night.
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